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Abstract
International water agreements are often used as mechanisms for fostering 
and institutionalizing political cooperation. Yet, since water resources in 
many places are being driven to the edge of their natural limits, a number 
of international organizations have formulated legal principles and norms 
aimed at helping states resolve water disputes. While states have been 
urged to adopt these principles, it seems that they often embrace other 
less-traditional alternatives that may better address their own political 
needs. The aim of this study is to examine why states fail or decline to 
adopt several of the general principles of customary law formulated by 
these international organizations and to investigate how creative language 
is often adapted instead. The principles examined include basin-wide devel-
opment and management; the appropriation of water according to clearly 
defined water rights; and joint management of shared water resources. The 
study focuses on three contemporary case studies centering on Israel, Jor-
dan, and the Palestinian Territories. It concludes that the negotiation over 
the legal terminology of agreements between these parties exemplifies the 
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power struggle and asymmetries between Israel and its neighbors. Much of 
the deadlock in the negotiations was resolved when the parties moved from 
their adversarial positions to address the underlying interests, in which a 
compromise was forged that captured elements of international law while 
still addressing the needs of the dominant riparian. These results indicate 
that under asymmetric settings, there is a need for creative legal discourse 
rather than an entrenchment of international water law, which has found 
to be a recipe for failure.
Introduction
Since water resources are being driven to the edge of their natural lim-
its, today even the most cooperative neighboring states find it difficult to 
achieve mutually acceptable arrangements over shared water resources 
(McCaffrey 2001). As a means for helping states negotiate resolutions to 
water disputes, a number of international bodies have formulated general 
legal principles and norms focusing on basin-wide development and man-
agement, the appropriation of water according to clearly defined water 
rights, and joint management of shared water resources (Benvenisti and 
Gvirtzman 1993; Conca et al. 2006). These principles and norms are intended 
to change the behavior of states by introducing new principles and norms 
of conduct. Among these international bodies are the International Law 
Association, which developed the 1966 Helsinki Rules and the 2004 Berlin 
Rules, and the International Law Commission. Today, nearly all states agree 
that the numerous water treaties and other international legal instruments 
testify to the existence of customary international law for transboundary 
water resources (Dellapenna 2006).
While states are being urged to adopt these principles and norms 
(Hayton and Utton 1989), emerging trends in transboundary water reg-
ulation suggest that, in fact, states tend to embrace other less-traditional 
principles that may better address their own political needs. For example, 
Conca et al. in their study on whether governments are converging on 
common principles for governing shared river basins found that there 
is only weak evidence for the actual adoption of common principles for 
regime formation (Conca et al. 2006). Also, Kliot and Shmueli (2001) deter-
mined that very few of the institutions they examined corresponded to 
the ideal model of institutions for the management of transborder water 
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resources, namely, a basin-wide multipurpose institution that treats the 
whole basin as a single unit and equitably integrates all riparians. Yet 
many of these institutions were nevertheless found to be effective in man-
aging the shared resource. Treaties in basins with multiple riparians are 
still often bilateral, and many of these treaties are based on needs rather 
than rights, as stipulated by customary law, and the coordination achieved 
is limited. In some cases it seems that even if the language of international 
law does appear in treaties, it actually has a different meaning there. Such 
was the case in the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable 
Development of the Mekong River Basin (1995 Mekong River Treaty) that, 
although employing the term “basin” treaty, often meant a watercourse, 
which is a smaller spatial unit of jurisdiction than a basin (Sneddon and 
Fox 2006).
The aim of this study is to examine why states fail or decline to adopt 
several of the general principles of customary law formulated by these 
international organizations and to identify the creative language that is 
adopted instead. The principles to be examined are 1) basin-wide develop-
ment and management; 2) the appropriation of water according to clearly 
defined water rights; and 3) joint management of water resources by all 
basin riparians.
To this end, a comparative research design is offered. Three case studies 
will be examined in detail, including the water components of the 1994 
Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan, the 1995 interim water agree-
ment (“Oslo II”) between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO); and the 2005 agreement between Israel, the Palestinian Authority 
and Jordan to conduct feasibility studies for a canal project between the 
Red and Dead Seas.
The study first examines the emergence of three core principles in inter-
national water law and their potential ability to address asymmetries. Next, 
through the three case studies, it seeks to understand why these so-called 
“ideal” principles are often not adopted and what alternative principles 
might replace them. Finally, it discusses the limits and limitations of the 
three principles vis-à-vis their ability to reconcile a negotiation process 
steeped in conflict.
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Principles of International Water Law 
and Addressing Asymmetries
The Principle of Basin-Wide Management
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the basin became the recognized 
unit for developing and managing water resources in individual multipur-
pose projects. But it was during the 1960s that the concept became wide-
spread in water development (Teclaff 1996). Basin-wide institutions are now 
pitched as the most appropriate unit for internalizing all externalities asso-
ciated with water-land-human interaction. Such water institutions include 
river basin councils, commissions, and authorities.
In the last few decades, legal scholars have also agreed that the critical 
unit of analysis for international water resources is that of the international 
drainage basin. For example, the International Law Association, already in 
1951, began endorsing the integrated basin principle (Teclaff 1996). This was 
followed the 1966 Helsinki Rules that promoted a holistic approach to water 
management at a basin level. In 1986, the scope and definition was widened 
by the ILA to encompass interrelated transboundary surface and ground-
waters as well as transboundary aquifers that are completely dissociated 
from any surface water resources (Seoul Rules 1986).
The Principle of Water Rights
Most legal systems today recognize and protect the property aspects of 
water rights (Solanes 2001). International law strives to delineate those 
riparian state rights to international water resources (Benvenisti and Gvirtz-
man 1993). The underlying rationale for establishing water rights is that a 
clear definition of who is entitled to use the water will reduce uncertainty 
and conflict (Pradhan and Meinzen-Dick 2001). This is in line with neo-
classical economics, which see property rights as a fundamental concept 
of development (Molle 2004). Thus, the “right” terminology has penetrated 
many of the legal instruments that seek to articulate or establish interna-
tional water law. For example, the Helsinki Rules put forth the notion of 
legal rights to water in many of its clauses (Helsinki Rules 1966). Similarly, 
the Watercourse Convention stresses the right of watercourse states to uti-
lize the watercourse (Article 5). The Berlin Rules, though not setting rights 
as a guideline for appropriating water, stress the right to have access to 
water (Berlin Rules 2004).
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The Principle of Joint Management
Navigation laid the groundwork for a legal or administrative unity of the 
river basin in politically divided basins. This sense of management unity 
was built upon as the non-navigation demands and the technological means 
to meet those demands grew. Indeed, in the United States from the 1940s to 
the 1970, a series of river basin commissions were established. During the 
1940s and 1950s, basin authorities emerged throughout the world: in India, 
Sri Lanka, Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, Australia, and other countries. These 
took a variety of forms. Some only coordinated planning while others estab-
lished a joint mechanism to govern the basin. In a coordinated structure 
each party has its own institutions that coordinate some of their activities. 
In a joint structure the activities were carried out by a joint institution to 
which the parties delegated authority (Haddad et al. 1999).
Acknowledging the benefits of cooperative water management, it seems 
that the international community has often advocated a high intensity of 
cooperation in the form of joint management structure. For example, the 
1997 Watercourse Convention establishes the general obligation to cooperate 
(Article 8), and the management required for cooperation (Article 24) called 
for the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions. Similarly, the 
Berlin Rules call for the establishment of a joint management arrangement 
to ensure equitable and sustainable use of water (Article 64).
These water law principles were developed to create a more level 
playing field and offset local asymmetries. To some extent, this position 
comports with the international legal theory that states are equal under 
international law, and, because of that equality, they are supposed to coop-
erate and negotiate in good faith. By requiring states to recognize the equal-
ity of sovereigns, and by obligating them to cooperate and negotiate in good 
faith, international law ensures that weaker states are dealt with fairly and 
justly by their “bigger siblings.”
The next section examines in detail three case studies in order to under-
stand the applicability of these “ideal” principles to an asymmetrical setting 
and alternative principles that might replace them if these principles are 
not adopted.
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Middle Eastern Water Agreements
Background on the Israeli-Arab Water Agreements
Most of Israel’s water resources are transboundary. Israelis, Jordanians, 
and the Palestinians share the lower basin of the Jordan River (see fig. 5-1), 
whose main flow comes from tributaries located in Lebanon and Syria 
that discharge some 1,250 million cubic meters (MCM) annually (Soffer 
and Kliot 1988). These waters are used both as a potable water supply of 
the metropolis of Amman, through the King Abdullah Canal, and for the 
water supply in Israel, through the Israeli National Water Carrier, built in 
1964. Israelis and the Palestinians also share the Mountain Aquifer, which 
supplies 672 MCM per year, according to the Oslo Interim Agreement. 
Israel uses nearly 80% of the water in this aquifer, and the Palestinians 
use the remainder (Trottier 1999). The Mountain Aquifer provides pris-
tine water to both sides, although it is highly susceptible to pollution due 
to its karstic structure; thus, its management requires a high degree of 
cooperation (Haddad et al. 1999). Finally, there is the Coastal Aquifer, the 
southern tip of which underlies the Gaza Strip. Until the 2005 disengage-
ment process, it provided water to both the Palestinian population and the 
Jewish settlements of the Strip. Today it is the only water source for the 
Palestinians in Gaza.
Despite the shared nature of the resources, both Israel and Jordan, in 
the 1950s, announced unilateral plans to develop the Jordan Basin. Israel 
planned the diversion of the northern Jordan River, through the construction 
of a carrier, to the Coastal Plain and Negev Desert (Naff and Matson 1984). 
Jordan opposed this out-of-basin water transfer and instead announced its 
intention to irrigate the Jordan Valley by channeling the Yarmouk River 
into the King Abdullah Channel, which is part of the same basin. As Israel 
started implementing its plan, a series of border clashes erupted between 
Israel and Syria; these clashes escalated to an armed conflict in 1953 (Wolf 
and Ross 1992). But even earlier the United States sent Eric Johnston as a 
special envoy to the region with the mission of reaching regional agreement 
between the riparian states on the division of the waters of the Jordan and 
Yarmouk Rivers. Johnston’s 1951 proposal was rejected by all countries, 
as was his 1955 version. Within a decade, the tension over water, coupled 
with the regional border dispute, led to numerous political clashes over 
water between Israel and Jordan, some of which developed into significant 
military confrontations.
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Figure 5-1. The geopolitical units in the Jordan River basin. 
Source: Soffer and Kliot 1988.
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After the Six-Day War of 1967 the geopolitical map of the Middle East 
changed dramatically. Apart from Israel’s victory in terms of land and bor-
ders, it also gained water resources by acquiring two of the three Jordan 
River headwaters, as well as winning control over the Mountain Aqui-
fer previously held by Jordan. Israeli military rule extended to all civilian 
affairs in the territory of the West Bank, including water (Tal 2002). This 
meant that drilling any well in the West Bank required an Israeli permit. 
Israel granted only 23 of these to Palestinians from 1967 to 1990 (Awartani 
1992). In contrast, during the same period Israel exploited this water to 
address the growing political pressure of its agricultural sector. Israel has 
also gradually increased its use of the Yarmouk and during the 1970s and 
‘1980s had plans to revive the Mediterranean Sea–Dead Sea Canal first visu-
alized a century earlier by the Zionist movement (Varadi 1990).
While Israel was developing the resource, Jordan and Syria did not sit 
idly by. In the mid-1970s, as Jordan faced water shortages in its main cities 
of Amman and Irbid, it revived its plan to jointly build a large storage 
facility on the Yarmouk with Syria. The plan for a “Unity Dam” was again 
discussed by the two at the end of the 1980s and ‘90s, causing consider-
able tension in Israel, which initially opposed its construction (Hof 1995; 
Keinan 2005). As all freshwater use has reached the limits of its availability 
in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Jordan, tensions over scarce 
water have increased.
The Madrid peace conference in 1991 and the many negotiations that 
followed marked a turning point in water relations. In Madrid, two parallel 
negotiating tracks—the bilateral and multilateral—were established. The 
former referred to direct negotiations between Israel and each of its imme-
diate Arab neighbors, with the exception of the Palestinians, who, at the 
time, were included in the Jordanian delegation at the insistence of Israel 
(Rubinstein 2004). The latter focused on key issues that concerned the entire 
Middle East and that might generate confidence-building measures (Peters 
1996). Each track was divided into groups that included the water issue. 
While the work on both tracks was progressing, Israel and the Palestinians 
initiated a secret negotiating track outside the framework of the Madrid 
conference that resulted in the Oslo I Accord, signed in September 1993. 
That accord, which announced the establishment of a Palestinian interim 
authority, also noted the need for cooperation in the field of water. Subse-
quent to Oslo I, Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
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in September 1995 signed the Oslo II Interim Agreement, in which article 
40 of Annex III addressed issues of water and sewage.
The moment it became clear that Israel and the PLO were about to sign 
Oslo I, the bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan intensified. Water was 
the last and most contentious issue resolved in those negotiations, which 
came to an end with the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in Octo-
ber 1994; Annex II of the treaty pertains to the two countries’ shared water.
The Israel-Jordanian agreement set in motion the plan to develop the 
Dead Sea area; both sides declared the Jordan Rift Valley a development 
zone and established the Trilateral Economic Committee and Jordan Rift 
Valley (JRV) Steering Committee. Finally, in April 2005, after 3 years of 
nego tiations, a feasibility study was signed for the environmental and social 
assessment of the Red Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance study.
The next section examines briefly the negotiations over the language 
negotiated and adopted in each of the three agreements.
Negotiating International Language
The Israeli-Jordanian agreement
A Jordanian demand that Israel reorganize their respective water rights was 
raised in 1992 while both countries discussed the common agenda for the 
coming water negotiations. Water rights were important for Jordan, whose 
use of the Jordan River had been diminished by Israel’s extensive use of that 
water (Haddadin 2001) and in light of the Palestinians obtaining reorgani-
zation of their own water rights in talks with Israel (Izraeli 2005). Water rights 
are based on several factors, such as hydrology, geography, and historical 
use and needs; the weight of each factor is not determined universally but 
rather based on the circumstances of each case. It was thus clear to Israel 
that setting the allocation on the basis of disputable algorithms would result 
in long-term disagreements (Shamir 2003). Even if the weight of each factor 
were agreed upon, Israel feared that Jordan’s water needs in the future would 
change, which may result in a demand for adjustment (Sabel 2005). Finally, 
Israel was concerned that recognizing its water rights on the Yarmouk might 
allow its neighbor to raise counter-claims on the Jordan River, which Israel 
wished to leave as an exclusively Israeli water body (Izraeli 2005). Instead, 
Israel preferred a clear division of water based on a definition of the water 
source and location, quantities, qualities, and pricing (Shamir 2003). The dis-
agreement was resolved by both sides putting forward the notion of securing 
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their respective “rightful water share,” the meaning of which was left to be 
defined in the next phase of negotiation (Common Agenda 1993).
As the controversy over water rights continued, the technique of incor-
porating both sides’ needs in the treaty language defused the deadlock. 
This occurred only when the formula of “rightful allocation” was intro-
duced at the late stages of negotiations. “Rightful allocation” implies that 
the Jordanian rights are the allocation both sides agree upon (Rizner 2005). 
This term served to provide a psychological reference to “rights” that was 
important to Jordan while basing the allocations on what is specified in the 
agreement, which was important to Israel (Shamir 2003).
Next, there was a need to clarify the meaning of “rightful allocation” 
and to divide the water between the two states accordingly. Jordan’s inter-
pretation of its respected water rights was to receive from Israel 200 MCM 
per year of potable water from the Jordan River, half of it from the Sea of 
Galilee, also known as Lake Kinneret (Haddadin 2001), on the basis that 
the lake is an international watercourse where Jordan is a riparian (Rizner 
2005). Israel, in contrast, argued that Jordan is not riparian to the lake itself 
(Katz-Oz 2005). Thus, Israel opposed including any reference in the treaty 
to the Jordan River as a “shared basin” (Sabel 2005) and insisted that the 
term “Lake Kinneret” not appear in the treaty language (Shamir 2005). As 
a result, although it was clear that the source of some of the water provided 
to Jordan is the lake itself, the lake’s name was not mentioned in the treaty, 
nor was there any reference to the Jordan River as a shared basin. Instead, 
it stated that the source would be “from the Jordan River directly upstream 
from the Deganya gates on the river” while the meaning of “Jordan River” 
was deliberately left ambiguous (Sabel 2005).
Finally, there was a need to set the degree of cooperation and depen-
dency required to execute the treaty provision. Israel was concerned that 
setting up a joint management structure in which both countries share and 
develop the basin resources might put the burden of droughts and funding 
new water resources on it, as it has more water alternatives (Rizner 2006). It 
was also concerned about any interpretation that might describe the treaty 
and its institutions as a symbol of Israel’s control in the basin (Shatner 2005). 
Consequently, the Joint Water Committee (JWC) was set up to oversee the 
treaty implementation and established coordination mechanisms rather 
than a joint or a cooperative framework. These were restricted to cooper-
ation in developing plans for purposes of increasing water supplies and 
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improving water use efficiency within the context of bilateral, regional, or 
international cooperation.
Figure 5-2 presents the language employed by both sides and how the 
differences in jargon were reconciled in the negotiation process.
Figure 5-2. Language evolution in the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations.
The Israeli-Palestinian agreement
While Jordan consented to discussing “allocations,” the Palestinians insisted 
on the division of water based on water rights (Shamir 1998). As a result, 
when the multilateral water group met in Geneva just after the Madrid con-
ference to discuss regional water issues, the Palestinians insisted that their 
water rights be negotiated; in response, Israel argued that this was a political 
topic that was outside the multilateral and technical scope of the discussion 
(Izraeli 2005). Instead, Israel suggested that until this issue was discussed 
during the permanent negotiations phase, both sides should adopt a “prag-
matic approach” of dividing the water according to the future needs of the 
Palestinians (Kantor 2005). The Palestinians refused to discuss water needs 
independently of water rights and left the multilateral water group until this 
issue returned to the agenda (Haddad 2004).
The Israeli objection to discussing Palestinian water rights based on the 
“reasonable and equitable” criteria originates with the fear that this term 
was not quantifiable (Kinarti 2006), and thus may build great expectations 
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on the Palestinian side (Rizner 2005). Israel was further concerned about 
water rights providing the Palestinians fixed entitlement to water even 
during a regional drought (Kantor 2005). The Palestinians, on the other 
hand, opted for water rights as leverage for land rights (Haddad 2004).
Another point of disagreement was the Palestinians’ wish that the 
agreement include “joint” management over the entire basin and a refer-
ence to them as riparian to the Dead Sea (Sabel 2005). For the Palestinians, 
terminology commonly used in international law was assumed to assure 
them the support of the international community (Attili 2006). Furthermore, 
attaining a joint basin-wide agreement and even a joint water utility might 
have provided the Palestinians with the power to reallocate existing water 
uses, which were dominated by Israel outside the West Bank (Attili 2004). 
Thus, not surprisingly, Israel opposed such terminology and opted for a 
coordinated management structure over the West Bank that would better 
reflect the existing status quo. Yet, it also suggested augmenting the Pales-
tinians’ water supply through a desalinization plant on the Israeli coast at 
Hadera (Katz-Oz 2005).
A breakthrough for the Palestinians occurred when Abraham Katz-Oz, 
the head of the Israeli negotiation team in the multilateral talks, agreed to 
acknowledge the Palestinians’ water rights on an equitable basis as well as 
their affinity to the Dead Sea. Once this was accepted there was no return 
and these issues were included in the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on the 
interim self-governance arrangements signed in Washington on September 
13, 1993 (Annex III, Article 1). Yet many of the Israeli negotiators who were 
against acknowledging the Palestinians’ water rights decided on a strategy 
of postponing the clarification of the meaning of “equitable water rights” to 
the permanent status negotiations. In the meantime, the Israeli strategy was 
to continue to advance water allocation based on the pragmatic approach 
(Kinarti 2006).
Next, in 1994 the Cairo Agreement was signed, Annex II (Article II) of 
which touched on shared water in the Gaza Strip. The agreement announced 
that a subcommittee would deal with water issues of mutual interest while 
its scope and scale were restricted, allowing the water sovereignty of each 
side to be maintained. The Cairo Agreement was followed by intensified 
negotiations that led, a year later, to the Taba Agreement, often called Oslo II, 
Article 40 of which addressed water and sewage. The clash between alloca-
tion based on rights versus allocation based on pragmatism was resolved in 
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the negotiations only when a third approach was adopted: negotiating the 
Palestinians’ interim water needs on the basis of population patterns and 
irrigation needs. Once the allocation was agreed, the Palestinian allotment 
was to be presented in the negotiated agreement as water rights based on 
reasonable and equitable criteria, again without clarifying what “reasonable 
and equitable” actually meant (Rizner 2005).
At Israel’s insistence the scale of the agreement was restricted to the 
West Bank rather than the entire basin (see fig. 5-1). Narrowing the scale 
prevented the Palestinians from gaining control of the major water source 
of Israel, located on the western fringe of the Mountain Aquifer outside 
the West Bank zone. To ensure that the agreement would not affect the 
Kinneret or the Jordan River, Israel made sure that it did not recognize the 
Palestinians as riparian to the Jordan basin; the agreement did not even 
mention this water resource (Rizner 2005). Instead, it said that “various” 
water resources would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, 
without clarifying the meaning of “various.”
Finally, to address the Israeli demand, a coordinating mechanism was 
set up to administer the agreement, with decisions made on a veto basis. 
Coordination should be understood in this context as an alternative to joint 
management. “Joint” would suggest ownership and “management” of a 
resource versus coordination, which indicates that each side is sovereign 
in its domain but agrees that certain matters can be managed together. 
The only shared structure was the establishment of an enforcement arm 
Figure 5-3. Language evolution in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
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of the JWC, termed Joint Supervision and Enforcement Team (JSET). The 
assumption was that a joint structure for enforcement would be inevitable 
since this would be the only way to prevent disagreements.
Figure 5-3 presents the language advanced by both sides and how the 
differences in terms were reconciled in the negotiation process.
The Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian agreement
Following a request by Jordan at the beginning of 2002, a World Bank Tech-
nical Assistance Mission visited the Hashemite Kingdom. The purpose of 
the visit was to assess the support of both Israel and Jordan for the Red 
Sea–Dead Sea Canal with the aim of saving the Dead Sea and providing 
desalinated freshwater to the region and especially to Amman (Red Sea–
Dead Sea 2002a). The two countries agreed to establish a small joint steering 
committee that included the World Bank and that would prepare the Terms 
of Reference (TOR) required for the project (Red Sea–Dead Sea 2002b). Sev-
eral months later, the principles for the TOR were submitted for acceptance 
by the Israeli Ministry of Regional Cooperation. The draft called for joint 
examination of the project by the two governments with the involvement 
of the World Bank, USAID, and/or the U.S. State Department. Both Jordan 
and Israel preferred a route entirely in Jordan. This would exclude some 
of the Israeli pressure groups that might oppose the project and would 
make it eligible for World Bank funding that only developing countries 
can receive (Benvenisti and Gvirtzman 1993). Yet the early draft addressed 
neither the scale of the examination nor the number of alternative routes 
to be examined (Israeli Government 2002). Following the early draft, the 
need to further advance the project was boosted by the Johannesburg World 
Summit on Sustainable Development and the Third Water Forum in Kyoto, 
both of which stressed the vision of saving the Dead Sea through the “peace 
conduit” (Johannesburg Summit 2002).
A year later, a more mature draft was issued by the World Bank. Fol-
lowing the Bank’s insistence, the draft now included the Palestinians 
as riparians in the agreement along with Israel and Jordan (Blitz 2006). 
It also paved the way for an examination of the water resources of the 
entire Jordan basin and for establishing regional joint institutions to gov-
ern the TOR (Red Sea–Dead Sea 2003a). Finally, it acknowledged the need 
for consultation with the public and implicitly the entitlement of all basin 
parties (including the Palestinians) to water and land rights in the basin. 
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Broadening both the scale and scope of investigation raised strong objection 
on behalf of Israel, while the Palestinians insisted on these changes (Red 
Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project 2003b). For the Palestinians, an 
agreement that touched on water and land issues in the entire basin, with 
reference to international law, was assumed to provide them with leverage 
for obtaining their “reasonable and equitable” water and land share in the 
permanent status negotiations with Israel (Attili 2006). In contrast, for Israel 
such an agreement might prejudge the results of the permanent status talks 
with the Palestinians and might infringe on its sovereignty and water and 
land resources, including Lake Kinneret and the Dead Sea (Keidar 2005; 
Blitz 2006). Instead, Israel suggested that the Palestinians’ participation be 
examined at a later stage, in accordance with the progress on the final nego-
tiations and to decouple the TOR from the regional water use, the peace 
process, and the upper basin riparians (Alaster 2006).
Despite pressure from both Jordan and the World Bank to accept the 
early draft (Bein 2006), Israel’s strong objection to the 2003 draft resulted 
in a revised draft published by the World Bank (Red Sea–Dead Sea 2004). 
The new version of the TOR excluded much of the customary law language 
found in the previous draft, including any reference to Lebanon and Syria 
as upper riparians, the option for a joint management structure governed 
by a regional institution, and the status of the Palestinians as riparians. 
Instead, the TOR included a statement that the agreement will not prej-
udice the riparian rights of any of the parties, that the nature of coopera-
tion remains to be studied, and that the parties status would change from 
riparians to “beneficiary party” (Red Sea–Dead Sea 2004). The “beneficiary” 
language adopted satisfied the Israeli demand for the passive status of the 
Palestinians (Alaster 2006; Yinon 2006) while the term “party” addressed 
the Palestinians’ needs for recognition as equal parties to the agreement 
(Attili 2006). The statement also addressed the Palestinians’ wish that the 
agreement not infringe on the rights of Syria and Lebanon, which were not 
involved in the negotiations, while for Israel it enabled decoupling of the 
agreement from the final negotiations.
However, despite the many compromises reached in the 2004 TOR 
version, Israel still objected to it. Israel wished to modify the objective of 
the study from saving the Dead Sea to a technical study that focuses on 
examining only the convenience route preferable to Jordan and Israel (Blitz 
2006). Reframing the objectives of the agreement would have lowered the 
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importance of an investigation into the management of the water uses in 
the entire basin, an issue that was problematic for both Jordan and Israel 
(Alaster 2006). However, the World Bank continued to insist on the need to 
see the TOR in a wider regional context that includes the peace and water 
management of the entire basin (Yinon 2006).
The breakthrough in the negotiations came just after the Israeli dis-
engagement from Gaza in 2005 and with the help of some more creative 
drafting (Yinon 2006). In the fourth draft of the agreement, the basin water 
study was replaced by policy statements each country issued on water 
resources management indicating that the nature of cooperation was to 
be studied rather than pointing toward joint management (Red Sea–Dead 
Sea 2005). Finally, the objectives of the study were framed to take on the 
semblance of a technical agreement, as requested by Jordan and Israel. 
This affected the parties involved in the negotiations on the Israeli side: the 
professional environmental community that headed the negotiations was 
replaced by the Israeli Water Commission team that now also addressed 
the political realities of negotiations in a conflict area. Politicizing the nego-
tiation process further excluded from the negotiation process the exam-
ination of other alternatives for the conveyance. Finally, in April 2005, the 
Figure 5-4. Language evolution in the Red–Dead negotiations.
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three beneficiaries signed an agreement to launch a feasibility study for 
the environmental and social assessment for the Red Sea–Dead Sea Water 
Conveyance study.
Figure 5-4 presents the language advanced by both the Palestinians and 
the Israelis and shows how the differences in language were reconciled in 
the negotiation process.
Creative Language to Circumvent Political Realities
Water problems are often characterized as “wicked” problems that face 
multiple and conflicting interests over the use of integrated natural sys-
tems such as an aquifer or a watershed (Scholz and Stiftel 2005). To solve 
these problems in an equitable and optimal manner, certain principles of 
international water law call for a higher degree of physical and institutional 
integration, often at a basin-wide scale, and a clearer definition of water 
rights. These principles presuppose the easing of existing power asymme-
tries between parties and prevent unilateral development activities that 
ignore the rights of other basin riparians (Molle et al. 2006).
In our case study, by requiring Israel to allocate water according to 
clearly defined Palestinian water rights, all riparian water rights are rec-
ognized, regardless of their relative economic, military, or other power. 
That recognition, theoretically, would prevent a more powerful state from 
unilaterally negating or diminishing the water rights of a weaker riparian. 
Similarly, by requiring a multilateral approach (e.g., joint management) 
to the administration of the Jordan Basin and the Mountain Aquifer by 
all basin riparians, the objectives and designs of the more powerful state 
would be subject to the full cooperation of the weaker riparian.
Against this assumption, it seems that real-life experience often deviates 
from the ideal legal structures. For example, Kliot and Shmueli (2001), while 
analyzing nine major river basins, found that in only a minority of them 
a high level of cooperation in the form of joint management is gained and 
only a minority of the multipartite basins has multilateral organizations 
in place (Dombrowsky 2005). When it comes to adopting water rights the 
situation is not different. In many of the disputes that have been resolved, 
particularly on arid or exotic streams, the paradigms used for negotiations 
have not been “rights-based” at all—neither on relative hydrography nor 
specifically on chronology of use but rather “needs-based” (such as the case 
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of Egypt and Sudan in their Nile River agreement from 1929 and 1959). In 
the case of basin-wide approaches it seems that there is a gap between real 
and ideal legal principles. For example, in 1970 when the United Nations 
considered the Helsinki Rules, according to Biswas (1999), some states 
objected to the prominence of the drainage basin approach, which can be 
interpreted as an infringement on a nation’s sovereignty.
The present study argues that it is unrealistic to expect a powerful ripar-
ian (in our case study, Israel) to relinquish its power advantage by accepting 
these three water principles, especially when the nature of the water dis-
pute extends beyond water. Thus, a more traditional “bottom-up” approach 
is employed to adopt “creative terminology” as a means for circumventing 
the volatility inherent in these principles.
Both the negotiation over the legal terminology and the language 
adopted were found in themselves to be a manifestation of the power strug-
gle and asymmetries between Israel and its neighbors. It was the weak 
riparians—the Jordanians and the Palestinians—that, in order to change 
the power balance and enhance their access to land and water resources, 
endorsed the language of international law, that is, calling for joint basin-
wide management based upon water rights, while Israel sought alternative 
terminology that would uphold the status quo. This explains why drafting 
the water treaties was found to be a complex, lengthy, and often contradic-
tory process, and one associated with high transaction costs. It also explains 
why the legal language that was finally adopted is rather ambiguous as 
ambiguity enabled virtual consent, which in turn allowed each side to 
assume that its own language dominates the treaty.
Much of the deadlock was resolved only when the parties moved from 
their adversarial positions to address the interests behind the positions, 
where a compromise was forged that captures elements of international 
law while still addressing the needs of the stronger riparian. For example, 
the adoption of rightful allocation terminology in the case of Israel and 
Jordan, and rights based on needs in the case of Israel and the Palestinians. 
The “rights” terminology came to satisfy the Jordanians or the Palestin-
ians, while the “allocation” or the “needs” terminology came to address 
the Israeli needs. The Red–Dead talks also exposed an integrative stage of 
negotiation during which the parties started to add benefits to the agree-
ments. This is the “beneficiary party” definition, which helped bypass any 
allocation and recognition based upon water “rights.”
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This evolution of water conflict negotiation under asymmetrical condi-
tions explains why the language adopted deviated from the recommended 
international legal norms while still managing to address the needs of the 
weak riparian. The result was often in adopting only minimal and vague 
definitions that capture the spirit of international law principles but also 
allowing the freedom to tailor the agreements to the specific asymmetries 
of these case studies. Yet, it seems that while Israel was willing to compro-
mise on the rights issue and the nature of cooperation, on the spatial scale 
the treaty’s language still reflects its power inequities. In fact, in all three 
agreements the mandate of the regime does not go beyond parts of the 
basin that may endanger Israeli sovereignty and water and land control.
The Weakness of Creative Language
Although the study’s aim is not to identify the ramifications of following 
these non-traditional language alternatives, attention should be paid to 
the long-term implications of the language adopted—especially given its 
abundant ambiguity and repeated failure to change the water status quo. 
In the case of the Israeli-Jordanian water agreement, this “creative ambi-
guity” was already found to be destructive, as both sides found it difficult 
to clarify under conflict (Fischhendler 2008). In the case of Israel-Palestin-
ian agreement, due to the language adopted, some do not even consider 
their allocations under the interim agreement to reflect their water rights 
as based on reasonable and equitable criteria (Attili 2006). Some inter-
national scholars have also criticized many of the institutional compo-
nents of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement as dressing up domination as 
“co-operation” (Selby 2003) or as an imposed-order regime that benefits 
the Israeli side at the expense of Palestinian water (Zeitoun 2007). Con-
sequently, the Palestinians have stated that in the final negotiations they 
must not repeat the language mistakes made in the Oslo agreement (Hus-
seni 2006). As a result, the 2000 water agreement draft agreed at Camp 
David (that was to replace the Oslo agreement) included more explicit 
language of international law, as it contains both references to “equitable 
and reasonable” and water rights language (Sher 2006). This entails the 
risk behind the use of such creative language in that it is still adopted in 
order to allow the more powerful state to cajole, or even force, the weaker 
state into submission. At the very least, by using its position of power, the 
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more powerful party can protect the status quo, which typically favors 
the stronger party.
Also in the case of the Red–Dead negotiations, many international and 
Israeli NGOs are dissatisfied with the exclusion of the entire basin, or at 
least the lower basin, from the feasibility study. As a result, many of these 
NGOs refer to the negative environmental externalities and inferior eco-
nomic solutions that are adopted with the nonbasin approach (Bein 2011; 
Gavrieli et al. 2002).
Conclusion
Negotiations in conflict areas over water resources are often conducted 
between unequal partners, with each bringing to the negotiation table con-
siderations that go beyond water (Lowi 1993). These conditions can often 
create conflicting patterns of interests such that under conflict conditions 
a basically nonpolitical issue, such as water allocation, can become politi-
cized. These conditions, in addition to stochastic power asymmetry, were 
often found to impede cooperation in many environmental and especially 
water problems (UNEP 2006). This suggests that the Israeli-Palestinian- 
Jordanian case is not exceptional. A more realistic language that better 
reflects the political and power asymmetries but still acknowledges the 
importance of the existing rules of customary law turns the Middle Eastern 
example to a possible option for other regions facing water disputes.
This linguistic compromises forged are based on the fact that all players 
had specific objectives in entering into negotiations and that a failure to 
reach an accord would result in harm to both parties. This was clearly the 
case regarding the Dead Sea water conduit since such an agreement upon 
development would provide benefits to all parties.
While the solutions crafted by the parties have not been adopted by 
other states or regions, they constitute examples of creative decision mak-
ing that might someday be adopted elsewhere under similar asymmetrical 
conditions. Ultimately, the Middle Eastern water experience teaches us that 
despite attempts to establish a “top-down” approach for the development 
of international water law for facilitating the drafting of water treaties, a 
broader approach that acknowledges the volatility, unique characteristics, 
and asymmetries inherent in these situations must be adopted. Otherwise 
the result may be no agreement at all. Yet, this study also highlights that 
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the negotiations do not occur in a vacuum but against the backdrop of 
asymmetrical power balance. This implies that the hegemonic state often 
is the one that set the tune in how the creative language would looks like.
Acknowledging the political realties in crafting legal language for agree-
ments still leaves us asking who typically comes up with the alternative 
mechanism or alternative principle—the stronger or the weaker state? It can 
be argued that the weaker state has an incentive to be creative in its rela-
tions with its more powerful neighbor; however, we can also could argue 
that, because of its stature, the more powerful state is in a better position to 
formulate and suggest alternatives. The second explanation might fit with 
the conclusions of this paper, namely that Israel, as the hegemonic riparian, 
sought alternative terminology as a means of circumventing the Jordanian 
and Palestinian endorsement of traditional international law concepts.
At the same time, recognizing the importance of creative terminology 
implies that skillful negotiators and implementers able to exploit open-
ings crafted by ambiguous language are assets that weaker parties need 
to cultivate.
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